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By applying the strategies of international anti-sweatshop campaigns to the 
Australian context, recent regulations governing home-based clothing production 
hold retailers responsible for policing the wages and employment conditions of 
clothing outworkers who manufacture clothing on their behalf.  This paper argues 
that the new approach oversimplifies the regulatory challenge by assuming (1) that 
Australian clothing production is organised in a hierarchical ‘buyer-led’ linear 
structure in which core retail firms have the capacity to control their suppliers’ 
behaviour; (2) that firms act as unitary moral agents; and (3) that interventions 
imported from other times and places are applicable to the contemporary Australian 
context. After considering some alternative regulatory approaches, the paper 
concludes that the new regulatory strategy effectively privatises responsibility for 
labour market conditions – a development that cries out for further debate.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As advancing global economic integration and neo-liberal economic policies combine 
to transform the Australian economy, changes in the nature of firms, workplaces and 
work are creating new challenges for the protection of workers’ rights.  Designing 
effective mechanisms for regulating the wages and conditions of workers who make 
clothing in their own homes—known in Australia as clothing outworkers—has proved 
particularly difficult.   
In recent years, innovative approaches to the re-regulation of clothing outwork in 
Australia have drawn on strategies developed by activist campaigners in Europe and 
the United States. These have brought together broad progressive community and 
political constituencies (including unions, community groups and students) in 
alliances dedicated to improving garment workers’ wages and conditions. As well as 
harnessing the opinion-forming influence of the mass media to pressure governments 
to introduce effective regulation, these strategies target firms directly, challenging 
them, as corporate citizens, to adopt ethical business practices (Harrod & O’Brien 
2002). These campaigns stand at the forefront of new models of union action in which 
activist networks promote communication and exchange across disparate locations—
linking people together through shared ideas and values, joint processes of issue 
construction and collective participation in debates about strategy—to produce 
communities of interest that legitimate collective action (Keck & Sikkink 1998). By 
reinterpreting and incorporating widely accepted ideas (of fair treatment, for 
example), activists are able to tap into ‘rhetorical commonplaces’ that resonate with a 
broad audience (de Winter 2001). As campaigns span multiple scales and sites, 
ranging from university campuses and workplaces to international regimes, their 
  
2
 
‘global’ strategies and alliances have influenced the shape of labour internationalism 
(Silvey 2004:191).   
From a perspective attuned to the dynamic nature of economic processes and the 
ways in which they reflexively interact with regulatory frameworks, this paper 
develops a sympathetic, theoretically-informed critique of these new interventions.1  It 
views firms as social constructs and as social actors enmeshed in multiple, constantly 
changing relationships that are infused with inequalities of power and influence.  
Individual firms restructure their operations in anticipation of and in response to 
regulatory changes, producing dynamic reconfigurations of inter-firm relationships, 
industrial structures and the locations at which particular production tasks are 
performed. Workforce profiles alter accordingly. In this way, the industrial division of 
labour, the labour market and forms of labour market regulation are dynamically 
intertwined with both the evolution of capitalist firms and the symbiotic relationship 
between states and firms (Offe 1985; Strange 1994).  In this context, the 
organisational effects of regulatory interventions are uneven – not only do they 
control the behaviour of some firms more effectively than others, but they at the same 
time stimulate the development of new profit-maximising organisational strategies. 
Therefore, the design of new labour market regulations should be based on a plausible 
account of industry structure and should anticipate how new provisions will alter firm 
strategies, relationships and organisational forms.  
From this starting point, this paper argues that Australia’s the new outwork policy 
solutions rely on idealised metaphors of industrial organisation that do not sufficiently 
acknowledge the heterogeneity and inherent instability of the clothing industry’s local 
organisational realities. As it details the gap between the theories on which the new 
outwork regulations are based and the reality of the Australian industry, it advocates a 
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more critical examination of the longer term implications of interventions that rely 
on firm goodwill. The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
background to regulation in Australia’s outwork clothing sector and details the new 
regulatory strategies.  Section Three questions the universal applicability of the 
hierarchical ‘buyer-led’ commodity chain metaphor on which the new regulations are 
based. It then examines the limitations of this understanding of the sector’s industrial 
organisation in the Australian policy context. Section Four challenges the idea that 
garment production firms act as moral agents and expresses deep reservations about 
the discursive construction of outworkers’ identities as victims of unscrupulous 
employers.  Section Five considers issues of compliance, discusses the potential for 
avoidance, and foreshadows some complementary approaches. The paper concludes 
that as the new regulatory approaches transfer responsibility for the surveillance and 
enforcement of labour standards to firms, they effectively privatise labour market 
regulation.   
OUTWORK REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Across western economies, the manufacture of clothing is an important source of low 
wage employment and a major employer of women and migrants. Its low entry and 
exit costs, mobility, modest skill demands and accessible product markets attract 
small business entrepreneurs seeking quick profits. Inexpensive technologies combine 
with the divisible nature of the work process to make clothing production amenable to 
small-scale, home-based enterprise.  These characteristics create numerous challenges 
for labour regulation.   
 In the early twentieth century, Australia’s centralised system of industrial 
regulation had restricted the organisational forms available to clothing producers and 
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as a result most clothing production took place in highly regulated factory 
environments. Although the small factory ‘sweat-shop’ form familiar in the United 
States barely existed in Australia, a semi-clandestine outwork sector persisted despite 
various attempts to outlaw it (Ellem 1991; Frances 1993). Australia’s system of 
arbitration and conciliation was ill-equipped to manage the dispersed organisation, 
intermittent activity and lack of worker organisation characteristic of home-based 
clothing production. In the early 1980s, however, as Australian trade unions 
responded to feminism, professionalism and the changing nature of work (Briggs 
2004:224), the policy attitude toward outwork changed from exclusion to inclusion, 
and outwork came to be recognised as legitimate work (Booth & Rubenstein 1990).  
In 1987, amendments to the federal Clothing Trades Award ‘deemed’ outworkers to 
be employees; a move that brought them into the centralised employment system and 
established Award wages and conditions (ACAC 1987).  
 The new regulations had an uneven impact.  In the first place, the regulatory 
coverage was incomplete, for its provisions applied only to those firms that were 
‘signatories’ to the Award; that is, to firms operating within the centralised industrial 
relations system.  Second, enforcement of Award conditions was inhibited by the 
logistical difficulties inherent in monitoring a spatially dispersed home-based 
workforce.  Third, the effectiveness of regulation was hampered by worker non-
compliance: whether through loyalty, desperation or fear of retribution, it appeared 
that outworkers were often complicit in disregarding Award conditions.  In effect, the 
regulatory framework contributed to the development of a three-tier structure within 
the outwork sector: some outworkers were employed under Award conditions; others 
worked outside the regulatory framework earning inferior wages and working in 
substandard conditions; while a third group operated as quasi-independent small 
  
5
 
business subcontractors, earning profits rather than wages. By 1995, the Textiles 
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia claimed that the local garment industry 
was structured around outwork in a barely regulated system that exploited pockets of 
disenfranchised labour, especially newly-arrived migrants and refugees (TCFUA 
1995).  As the ‘unregulated’ sub-sector flourished by undercutting the prices of both 
factory and ‘regulated’ outwork manufacturers, employer groups came to support the 
introduction of additional regulation (Weller 1999).   
The rapid expansion of outwork-based production in the years 1993–1996 
reflected the international reorientation of the Australian economy. In the early 1990s, 
the removal of the quotas and tariffs that had protected Australian manufacturers from 
import competition resulted in a flood of imported garments and many factory-based 
manufacturers and their employees were forced out of the industry. A new generation 
of subcontractor firms entered the domestic market (Webber & Weller 2001). 
Operating on a shoe-string ‘just-in-time’ production model, they avoided the ‘sunk 
costs’ of factory premises and opted for the numerical and temporal flexibility of 
outworker-based production.   
The new production structure involved deep changes to the sector’s composition 
and relationships. The Federal government’s 1994 Working Nation labour market 
reforms, which allowed welfare beneficiaries to earn modest additional income, 
created a labour force available to work cheaply and on an intermittent basis. Outwork 
also flourished as falling real wages made it increasingly difficult for families to 
manage with one ‘breadwinner’ income.  The restructuring of the clothing sector’s 
labour supply transcended the ‘spatial fix’ of the old, protected economy as it 
relocated from the inner city to the suburbs and replaced an ageing, unionised and 
factory-based pre-liberalisation workforce (predominantly of post-World War II 
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European migrants) with a younger, more ‘flexible’ workforce drawn predominantly 
from Asian background migrant groups (Webber & Weller 2001).  The sector’s 
dispersal to the suburbs made it a difficult target for regulators. More importantly, 
regulatory frameworks that assumed continuous employment and unionised 
workplaces could not effectively regulate outwork’s intermittent work, its blurring of 
the relationship between employers and employees, or its positioning beyond the 
reach of organised labour and collective bargaining mechanisms. Effective 
intervention would require novel strategies.   
The Fairwear Strategies 
In the mid 1990s, Australian clothing unions and local Fairwear campaigners 
combined to pioneer new forms of community–union cooperation that target multiple 
actors including retailers, clothing firms and state instrumentalities (at federal, state 
and local levels) simultaneously.  These campaigns have drawn in less radical 
constituencies such as church groups by emphasising the protection of basic human 
rights and the enforcement of internationally accepted core labour standards, as 
expressed in International Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations (UN) 
agreements. The local campaigns drew extensive support from international advocacy 
networks (Delaney 2004). As such, they represent a worker-oriented version of the 
international processes of ‘fast policy transfer’ that have become an integral 
component of economic globalisation (Peck and Theodore 2000). 
The debates generated by local activists in the mid 1990s highlighted the 
inadequacies of the existing regulations and turned public opinion toward bolstering 
regulatory mechanisms.  After being targeted by Fairwear shame campaigns, 
numerous firms agreed to adopt voluntary ‘Codes of Practice’ and to observe Award 
conditions. The campaigners won widespread support for the idea that retailers should 
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be made responsible for policing working conditions in subcontracting firms. 
Activist pressure prompted a Parliamentary Inquiry in 1996, after which the Federal 
(Howard) Government acknowledged outwork as the ‘rotten apple’ that threatened to 
discredit its neo-liberal workplace reform agenda. Outwork regulation was 
subsequently included as an Allowable Matter in the 1996 Workplace Relations Act. 
New Regulatory Approaches 
 Since 1996, activist campaigns have increasingly targeted State jurisdictions, where 
Labor governments have been more amenable to protecting workers’ rights. As a 
result, governments in five States have legislated to provide outworkers with the legal 
status of employees, giving them access to the range of benefits—such as 
superannuation and long service leave—enjoyed by factory-based workers (Hulls 
2003).   
 The new regulatory frameworks in Australia’s two leading garment-producing 
States, New South Wales and Victoria, represent a major change in approach to 
labour regulation by shifting responsibility for outworker wages and conditions to the 
leading firms in disarticulated supply chains   In both the New South Wales 2001 
Behind the Label strategy and the Victorian Outwork (Additional Protection) Act 
2003, the retail or brand firms that commission the production of outworker-made 
garments are made responsible for monitoring outworker wages and conditions in 
subcontracting firms. The provisions also establish a system for the recovery of 
unpaid wages from an ‘apparent’ employer located at a higher level in the production 
hierarchy, strengthen government enforcement powers, provide mechanisms for union 
representatives to enter premises to monitor the system, and establish committees to 
oversee implementation.  In both States, regulation has been accompanied by public 
awareness and education campaigns, the promotion of corporate ‘Codes of Practice’, 
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and renewed efforts to organise outworkers.  In New South Wales, a complementary 
project promotes cooperation and efficiency along the supply chain (Greig 2002). 
Together, the interventions aim to produce a dynamic and competitive local garment 
production industry in which home-based outworkers are fairly renumerated.  
 Whilst on the surface the new approaches appear to revolutionise regulation 
and offer an effective method for protecting vulnerable workers, they are grounded in 
a particular set of assumptions about the nature of clothing firms and the relationships 
between clothing sector firms and workers. The next section analyses these 
assumptions and their implications for regulation. It begins by examining the linear 
metaphor of industrial organisation that underpins the new approach and then assesses 
its applicability to the Australian context, considering in turn the extent ‘vertically 
disintegrated’ subcontracting, the power of retailers, the power of consumers and the 
notion of supply chain efficiency.  
FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE NEW STRATEGIES 
The new outwork regulations rely on a widely accepted description or ‘way of seeing’ 
the garment production industry as organised in hierarchical ‘retailer-led’ 
constellations of interlinked, vertically disintegrated firms. In this linear metaphor, 
groups of firms are envisaged as linked by the sequential order of value-adding 
processes that transform raw materials into finished goods.  This view unites 
otherwise disparate interests by creating a common understanding of how the industry 
‘works’ – creating a space where the understandings of firms, unions, government and 
community activists converge.  However, this commonplace description is actually a 
hybrid of two potentially conflicting explanations of industrial organisation: the world 
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system theory-inspired ‘global commodity chain’ (GCC) metaphor and the more 
business-oriented supply chain management perspective.  
In the ‘global commodity chain’ metaphor, firms are ‘ordered’ by the sequential 
stages of the vertical value-adding commodity flow.  As commodity chains extend 
across space to link organisations, activities and individuals in product-focused, 
transnational production systems, they transcend national boundaries and sidestep 
national regulatory constraints as they reconfigure to maximize profitability (for 
example, by relocating to low wage production sites).  Structurally, GCCs are 
characterised by three interdependent dimensions: an input-output structure, a 
territoriality, and a structure of governance (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994). In 
consumer-oriented industries like garment production, chains typically adopt a buyer-
led formation dominated by core firms positioned close to retail markets (Gereffi 
1994).  
Central to the GCC approach is the notion that production systems are permeated 
by power inequities that shape the nature of interactions both within and between 
firms. Capital-rich core firms at the peak of chains accrue wealth (surplus) because, as 
buyers in the subcontracting structure, they enjoy a bargaining advantage that enables 
them to transfer business risk down the chain, to smaller firms and ultimately to 
individual (out)workers.  Here, competition is played out between firms within chains 
at least as much as it is between opposing chains. This effect is exaggerated in the 
clothing sector, where brand-based quasi-monopolies limit competition to non-price 
factors and reduce direct inter-chain price competition. By this assessment, the 
exploitation of production-level workers is central to the process of extracting 
economic rents (surplus). The GCC metaphor’s foundational assumptions can be 
summarised as follows: 
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(1) The clothing industry comprises linear sequences of subcontracting firms 
linked by value adding processes;  
(2) These chains link firms and individuals whose roles are defined sequentially as 
retailer, wholesaler, manufacturer, subcontractor and outworker;  
(3) Sequences of firms are organised hierarchically and controlled by powerful core 
firms (usually retailers); 
(4) ‘Chains’ extend from outworkers to consumers and are coherent through their 
length. It is possible to trace direct linkages in chains;  
(5) Given the monopolistic and oligopolistic competition characteristic of garment 
markets, surplus accrues from competition within chains; 
(6) The magnitude of the profit shares in different parts of the chain reflects inherent 
power differentials. 
The global commodity chain approach reveals the human face of exploitation and 
politicises industrial structures in a way that links the micro world of consumer 
purchases to the macro issues of capitalist globalisation. Through its capacity to 
incorporate power relations, firm strategies and community resistances, this metaphor 
stimulates political action for social change. Accordingly, it dominates popular left 
examinations of the global clothing industries (such as Klein 2000; Ross 1997; see 
also Johns & Vural 2000).  In these accounts, the growth of outwork exemplifies the 
emergence of a Third World underclass within the First world.  
  Business managers and government policy-makers have been guided by a 
related metaphor based on ‘value chain’ or ‘supply channel’ management. This 
version of the linear production model is derived from Porter’s (1990; 1998) 
influential studies on the competitive advantage of firms and nations. Like GCC, it 
conceptualises firms as embedded in a production system organised around the 
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vertical flow of value-adding processes. Like GCC, it stresses core firms’ 
imperative to control production costs, delivery schedules and product quality through 
the active management of suppliers.  But in contrast to GCC, this process is 
understood as a joint enterprise, where all firms in the supply flow share responsibility 
for ensuring the market competitiveness of the final product.  The supply chain’s 
constituents interact on an equal footing as rational, independent economic actors with 
a common objective.  Power differences within the chain are downplayed; 
competitiveness is promoted by nurturing by inter-firm trust and cooperation.  
In contrast to GCC, which views competition as occurring within chains, the 
value chain perspective stresses cooperation and efficiency within chains and 
competition between chains. Although this fundamental theoretical difference is rarely 
explicit, it leads to quite different conclusions about the likely outcomes of regulatory 
intervention.  It is important to recognise that Australia’s new forms of outwork 
regulation—where the core firms in supply chains are responsible for policing 
‘subordinate’ subcontractors—only make sense from within a linear understanding of 
industry structure.  Moving from this perspective destabilises the strategies’ apparent 
coherence. 
The problem is that linear metaphors are only some of a number of plausible 
‘ways of seeing’ the structure of clothing industry.  The first alternative view comes 
from the network-based approaches commonly associated with the ‘industrial 
districts’ and ‘learning regions’ literature (Scott 1999).  These emphasise place-based 
industrial agglomeration where local synergies promote the competitiveness of groups 
of small, specialised firms.  Numerous small-scale examples of this type of local 
agglomeration can be found in the garment-manufacturing suburbs of Surrey Hills in 
New South Wales and Richmond in Victoria. The second alternative perspective is 
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based on a neo-classical account of industrial structure where atomistic independent 
firms make rational, profit-maximising ‘make or buy’ decisions and trade on an arms-
length basis.  This view guided Australia’s policy settings for the clothing sector in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (IC 1997).  The third option is the notion of global 
production networks (GPN), where observed industrial structures are conceived as the 
outcome of complex interactions between firms, markets, organisations, governments 
and other actors, within and between places and at various (local, regional, national 
and global) scales (Henderson et al. 2002).  The point is that forms of industrial 
organisation cannot simply be read from knowledge of the type of industry or the 
nature of its products.  Actual configurations – of any part, of any industry, at any 
time or place – must be established empirically. In summary, the linear metaphor is by 
no means the only way to comprehend the clothing industry’s interfirm interactions or 
its strategies of accumulation.   
FROM THEORY TO POLICY  
The value chain approach has been influential in industrial policy, where governments 
have sought to promote the competitiveness of local, territorially defined supply 
chains by creating supportive regulatory conditions that promote efficiency without 
distorting market processes. However, the Australian Government’s 2000 Action 
Agenda (TCF&L Action Agenda 2000), contains elements of both GCC and supply 
chain thinking.  Its primary objectives of promoting inter-firm cooperation and 
targeting supply chain inefficiencies follow a value chain metaphor, but it also 
includes the GCC-like expectation that outworkers’ conditions can be improved by 
redistributing benefits within the production chain.  From its perspective, the policy 
understanding of situation of clothing outworkers might be summarised as follows: 
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(1) Improving the efficiency of supply chains will translate into better quality 
products at a more competitive price, and therefore improve the overall 
competitiveness of the Australian clothing sector; 
(2) The major inefficiencies are persistent quality problems, labour turnover and the 
numerous intermediaries or ‘middlemen’ that take a share of the surplus but add 
little ‘value’ to commodity production.  
(3) These problems can be addressed by developing inter-firm cooperation, 
eliminating superfluous production steps and processes, and by improving the 
wages and conditions of outworkers; 
(4) This can be achieved without increasing retail prices by redirecting surplus from 
‘middlemen’ to the outworker labour force. 
Thus, the policy framework for the revitalisation of the local garment industries 
complements the new outwork regulatory strategies by providing a discourse in which 
the objective of improving the outwork wages and conditions is made consistent with 
objective of improving industry efficiency.  However, as the policy framework 
follows the linear supply chain metaphor, it makes numerous assumptions about the 
structure and composition of the local garment production industry and about the 
likely effects of intervention.  As the sections below explain, some of these are not 
applicable to the Australian context, and others apply only with qualification.   
Vertically Disintegrated Production 
Outwork regulation and industry policy settings assume that the clothing industry is 
organised in a vertically disintegrated production structure linking sequences of 
highly specialised firms, where those specialising in ‘fabrication’ (sewing pieces of 
cut cloth together) engage or comprise outwork labour.  Yet although a significant 
part of the Australian garment industry is organised on a vertical disintegrated 
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subcontracting model (Parliament of Australia 1996), this organisational form is by 
no means universal.  In fact, one of the central requirements of a competitive 
vertically disintegrated structure—the presence of large pools of competing and 
cooperating firms—is not met in the Australian case. As local factory production 
contracted in the 1990s, remaining firms became increasingly dependent on smaller 
groups of customers and suppliers, and by 2001 the local production sector had 
become too small for the ‘buyer-led’ model to operate in textbook fashion.2  
Competitive subcontracting could have been sustainable in the sector’s least 
specialised segments, where production volumes are sufficient to support multiple 
firms, but these segments are also the most vulnerable to import competition. A 
smaller range of subcontracting options implies higher subcontracting risk.   
Although conditions of co-dependence favour cooperative ‘value chain’ 
network forms of organisation, cooperative structures are not the most efficient 
organisational option for the garment industries.  Cooperative supply structures tend 
to ‘work’ in industries such as automobile manufacture, where stable product markets, 
complex technologies, long product life cycles, high levels of ‘sunk’ immobile 
investments and long return-on-investment horizons promote supply chain ‘lock-in’ 
and durable, clear-cut authority structures.  In contrast, clothing production thrives in 
conditions where dynamic, loosely coupled structures are able to alter their shape 
seasonally, depending on the skills and materials demanded by the product range and 
the shifting fortunes of particular retail brands.  Although garment retailers may seek 
to ‘lock in’ committed suppliers, there is little payoff for suppliers to make credible 
commitments to buyers, since a rational supplier would maximise her autonomy in 
anticipation of a change in buyer fortunes.   
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In supply structures characterised by short-term or transient inter-firm 
relations, buyer firms have limited capacity to exercise the coercive powers of control 
that are expected in retailer-led outwork regulation.  
Retail Dominance 
Popular accounts of the clothing sector’s ‘buyer-led’ linear formation are based on 
well-known studies of the competitive success of vertically disintegrated international 
firms like Nike and Benetton – firms that draw supplies from production facilities in 
low wage sites across the globe and act as price-setters in global markets. 
International outwork campaigns are modelled on the experiences of campaigns 
targeting these powerful firms that are unquestionably in a position to dominate their 
suppliers. Negotiated bilateral international trade agreements as World Trade 
Organisation agreements continue to protect garment markets in Europe and the 
United States, where these firms mainly operate. These conditions are not typical of 
garment retailing in Australia. 
In Australia, in fact, retailers are frequently less powerful than their suppliers.  
As a result of the peculiarities of Australia’s pre-liberalisation structures of industry 
protection, mergers and acquisitions in both the garment retailing and garment 
manufacturing sectors generated an unusually concentrated industry structure.  In the 
years before 1991, the organisational structure did not conform to the ‘buyer-led’ 
model, but was framed by a power struggle between the major retailer, Coles-Myer, 
and the major manufacturer/wholesaler Pacific Dunlop, now Pacific Brands (O’Neill 
1994).  By the late 1990s, restructuring associated with trade liberalisation had not 
only changed the structure of the garment manufacturing industries, had also altered 
the structure of garment retailing.  This brought it closer to the ‘buyer-led’ 
configuration as specialist retailer chains—the part of the industry using vertically 
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disintegrated outwork production—increased their market share relative to 
Department stores (see Weller 2000a).  In international terms, however, Australian 
garment chain stores are small firms with limited market power. 
The crucial difference between Australian garment retailing and the situation 
in Europe and the United States is that local chain retailers are forced to compete 
directly with the global fashion brands that manufacture in low wage countries and 
derive economies of scale from their international market reach.  As a result, local 
firms are not able to raise their prices above the international benchmarks set by 
imports, which undermines their capacity to set prices that are ‘fair’ in terms of local 
factor (wage) costs. Limited price flexibility in retail markets is a major point of 
divergence from the overseas prototypes on which anti-sweatshop campaigns are 
based.   
If local retail brands increased their price and become uncompetitive relative 
to global import brands, outworkers’ jobs would be lost as indirectly moved offshore.3  
As Australia’s clothing industry policies recognise, given that local garment prices 
cannot increase in a competitive market, then improved wages and conditions for 
outworkers must be achieved either by reducing firms’ profit margins or by 
eliminating supply chain inefficiencies.  To avoid the former, the only option is to 
target inefficiencies.  Given that outwork is a highly ‘efficient’ model in terms of 
labour productivity, the search for efficiency must target other aspects of the 
production process. 
Supply Chain Efficiency 
In practice, the aim to improve the situation of outworkers by improving the 
transparency and efficiency of supply chains translates into strategies to eliminate 
‘unnecessary’ steps in the value adding sequence, in effect, to close the gap between 
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retailers and outworkers (TCF&L Action Agenda 2000).  This objective involves 
demonising the greedy ‘middlemen’ who extract profits from the supply chain 
without adding a commensurate amount of ‘value.’  In some instances, for example, 
retailers have blamed outworkers’ plight on wholesalers’ failure to pass on their 
contract payments, which are based on the assumption of the payment of Award 
wages to production workers (Parliament of Australia 1996).   
Yet portraying ‘middlemen’ as inefficient reflects the commodity-based linear 
metaphor’s tendency to undervalue processes that are not directly concerned with the 
commodity production sequence.  As a result, intermediaries’ irreplaceable functions 
are overlooked.  First, intermediaries maintain and reproduce networks of outworker 
labour. This indispensable if ethically questionable task—of locating pools of workers 
willing to work on intermittent schedules for comparatively low wages—is best 
organised at the community level, close to the potential workforce.4   Second, 
intermediaries bridge a social divide. Few retailers could comfortably work in the 
communities where outworkers are located; the social and geographical distances 
between retailers and outworkers are simply too great. Third, intermediaries not only 
manage the logistics of delivering and picking up work from outworkers’ homes, but 
they also monitor quality standards and ensure timely completion. This requires skills 
that retailers rarely possess: a detailed knowledge of garment production technologies 
combined with the ability to deploy methods of power that are effective in the 
outwork context.  Shifting from a commodity-based to a production management 
perspective reveals ‘middlemen’ as the crucial link in the outwork production chain.   
Perhaps more importantly, the notion that the ‘fat’ in the production system could 
be captured from middlemen and redistributed to outworkers directly contradicts the 
GCC expectation that surplus will accrue to the most powerful actors in the 
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commodity chain structure. In a market economy where differences in bargaining 
power at each dyad link of the supply chain determine prices, including the price of 
outwork labour, it is unlikely that savings from improved supply chain efficiency 
would flow to outworkers. It is instructive to recollect that before trade liberalisation, 
when the clothing industry was protected from competition, it offered the lowest 
wages of all manufacturing sectors while enjoying better than average rates of profit 
(Webber & Weller 2001).5 
Traceable Linkages and Consumer Power  
When retail-led outwork regulation and activist campaigns pressure retailers to accept 
responsibility for outworker wages and conditions, they assume that inter-firm 
linkages in the clothing sector can be directly traced from outworkers to consumers, 
and that this inescapable link makes firms vulnerable to intervention.  
This notion has transferred to the clothing industry from studies of the food 
industries, where marketers enhance the symbolic value of their products by 
promoting their provenance and highlighting the ‘natural’ connections between 
products and their places of origin (for example, Scotch Whisky, King Island cheese). 
Activist attention to the unpleasant or unethical aspects of production at the source of 
food chains is successful because it directly attacks the core marketing values of these 
brands. But this link between value and origin takes a different form in clothing 
sector, where the symbolic value of garments is undermined by reminders of the raw 
materials and the work involved in their fabrication.6  Instead, garment marketers 
associate finished products with fashionable places (Paris, Milan) and create illusions 
to cosmopolitan or luxury lifestyles that aim to separate products from their 
commodity natures.  As a result, retail firms purposefully seek to generate 
discontinuities that break up or conceal tangible connections between the conditions 
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of production and the ambience of retail showrooms. It follows that in garment 
markets, firms are likely to respond to activist campaigns by intensifying their efforts 
to obscure any direct linkages with the origins of garments. If outworker-made 
garments emerge from fractured organisational configurations in which arms-length, 
‘ask no questions’ transactions are the norm, conditions in the labour market will not 
be controllable by supply chain-based intervention. Moreover, as the complexity of 
the industry increases, the likelihood and feasibility of effective top-down control 
decreases.  
Connectedly, one of the central pillars outwork activism is the idea that firms 
will derive a market advantage, through enhanced brand image or increased sales, by 
publicising their compliance with outwork regulation.  Accordingly, and following 
accepted labelling practices (‘No animal testing’), compliance with the new 
regulations in New South Wales and Victoria earns firms the right to label garments 
with a tag certifying that their products are made under Award conditions.  But 
reminding potential buyers of the real world origins of garments directly contradicts 
the principles of fashion marketing.  Fashion retailers spend lavishly to construct 
luxurious in-store environments or ‘dream worlds’ that transform shopping into an 
opportunity to step out of the mundane everyday world and its worries (Wilson 1987). 
Fair trade labelling would break the spell by encouraging consumers to think about 
the number of hours of work required to purchase a garment and about the amount of 
money outworkers have been paid to make it.  For consumer groups sensitive to 
labour standards, labelling might promote sales by bringing the brand closer the 
worldview of its target consumers, but in dream-world markets, drawing attention to 
the conditions of production is likely to reduce rather than increase sales, and firms 
are therefore likely to resist labelling initiatives.   
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DISCOURSES ABOUT FIRMS AND WORKERS 
Global anti-sweatshop campaigns consciously work to reshape public expectations of 
appropriate corporate behaviour and to reconstruct the boundaries of corporate social 
responsibility.  In Australia, campaigns to re-regulate outwork labour rely on a 
discourse that constructs firms as moral agents – that is, as entities with the ability to 
undertake directed action, to recognise the outcomes of action, to take responsibility, 
and if necessary, to adjust their behaviour accordingly (de Winter 2001).7 This 
discourse extends firm responsibilities beyond the accepted range of business 
activities focussed on enhancing the commercial bottom line (Millstein 1998:25). The 
new regulations in New South Wales and Victoria also rely on the idea that firms – 
rather than the people that work in them – are capable of behaving ethically. 
When firms are conceived as moral agents, they are attributed the capacity to 
experience human-like emotions such as shame.  Shaming strategies have been central 
to community action on unethical corporate practices, including the exploitation of 
outwork labour.  These strategies place consumers ‘above’ retailers in the hierarchy of 
supply chain power and challenge firms to live up to their own ‘socially responsible’ 
corporate slogans. They threaten to penalise recalcitrant firms by activating consumer 
buying power. 
However, by casting firms as moral actors, this discourse conceals firms’ 
identities as profit-seekers in the capitalist economy and alters the ways we think 
about industrial relations and corporate practices.  When these strategies have been 
effective, firms’ compliance with ‘ethical sourcing’ is taken as evidence of their 
ethical intent, and as demonstrating their status as unitary moral agents.  But 
responsible behaviours can also be interpreted as the favoured strategy of firms 
marketing to ‘socially aware’ consumer groups.  To insinuate their brand messages 
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into the worldview of their target consumers, clothing firms routinely nurture the 
relationship between dress practices and identity (Davis 1992). If fashion-conscious 
consumers believe that shopping for ‘ethically made’ fashion clothing is an effective 
means to change the world, then that sentiment will be quickly incorporated into the 
brand image. Responding to such market signals is simply good business.  However, 
if firm motivation is strategic, aiming to protect of brand image (Cragg 2005), , rather 
than an indication of an ‘ethical’ disposition then the level of corporate goodwill will 
vary with the intensity of anti-sweatshop sentiment among each brand’s target 
consumer segment. Gains made in progressive market segments will not generalise to 
the wider industry until all consumers decline to buy goods made under exploitative 
conditions.   
The negative aspects of constructing firms as moral agents have long-term 
implications that need to be considered.  There are two issues here – one concerns 
corporate power and the other, workers’ rights.  First, as corporate ‘shaming’ 
strategies target brand identities, they can also act to reinforce firms’ powerful, 
monolithic brand images; in effect, creating greater brand coherence by inserting a 
defining opposition.  In this way, strategies that ‘play’ to brand identities risk being 
co-opted and negated by brand marketers, as in the case of Nike, which has managed 
to subvert the anti-sweatshop message to reinforce its ‘No Sweat’ brand identity 
(McKay 1995).   
With regard to worker rights, the use of moral entreaties to secure community 
support for social action necessarily positions outworkers as morally wronged.  Thus, 
outworkers must be depicted as more vulnerable than other workers, as the victims of 
unscrupulous middlemen, and as incapable of defending their interests (that is, not 
without more external intervention than other workers). By ‘constructing the 
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sweatshop workers as tragic victims for the colonizing gaze of benevolent liberal 
reformers and anti-sweatshop activists’ (Morton 2003), campaigners have created 
outworkers in a Third World underclass image, as an ‘Other’ that is the antithesis of 
the ethical consumer.  Activist campaigns then neatly reunite the opposites by forging 
an emotional and political link in which consumers reach out to outworkers. There is 
no space here for alternative narratives, such as the outworker as ambitious migrant 
entrepreneur (O’Neill 1997). Outworkers are never constructed as heroically 
managing households, children and work under arduous circumstances.8  Such stories, 
unfortunately, do not fit the ‘moral’ framing of the issue.  Nor are they as appealing to 
the media, whose continuing interest in the plight of outworkers sustains activist 
strategies. 
 In contrast to union-based campaigns that have emphasised bringing outworkers 
onto an equal footing with factory-based workers, activist campaigns based on 
‘shaming’ work to welfarist objectives (a social rescue mission), rather than industrial 
ones (the universal defence of workers’ rights). The politics of compassion risks 
further undermining outworkers’ social position by stereotyping their qualities and 
reinforcing their social disempowerment. In this context, it is not at all surprising that 
many outworkers attempt to reinvent themselves as small business entrepreneurs to 
avoid the social stigma that emerges as an unintended consequence of the outwork 
campaigns.  In addition, as these campaigns characterise outwork as atypical, they 
locate clothing outworkers as different from both factory workers and from home-
based workers in other industries. Yet, in the current industrial relations environment, 
outworkers are by no means the only workers facing manifestly inequitable 
bargaining conditions. It is important to keep in mind, too, that working in a clothing 
factory has not always been a bed of roses, even under Award conditions, and that 
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women with care responsibilities see many benefits in the flexibilities of outwork.  
Typecasting outwork drives further the wedge of social inequality in Australia.    
COMPLIANCE AND DYNAMIC READJUSTMENT 
Internationally, competitiveness in the garment production industries has been 
intertwined with firms’ capacities to exploit the uneven landscapes of regulation. At 
the same time, multiple forms of industrial organisation coexist in dynamic economies 
and the organisational mosaic changes continually as firms alter their competitive 
strategies and refigure their social linkages to maintain competitiveness. It follows 
that any changes in regulation will stimulate reactive and proactive reconfigurations 
of firms and industries.  As Australia’s new forms of outwork regulation generate 
reactive restructuring, the test of the new rules will be in their capacity to restrict the 
previously ‘unregulated’ sub-sector without creating new opportunities for regulatory 
avoidance.   
If we accept that firms’ uneven compliance with outwork regulation reflects their 
market position rather than their ethical disposition, then it is reasonable to think 
about how different types of outwork production might be influenced by the new 
regulatory context. For this purpose, the structure of Australian garment production 
can be understood as comprising four basic segments:   
a) Brands that sell their products to a consumer market sensitive to the conditions of 
production; 
b) Brands that sell their products to a consumer market more interested in price than 
the conditions of production; 
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c) Firms that are not brand owners (and are therefore not directly subject to the 
discipline of the consumer market) but which operate in accordance with the 
spirit and letter of industrial relations law; 
d) Firms that are not brand owners and which operate on a profit-maximisation 
basis.  
Accurately gauging the size of these segments is less important for the current 
argument than recognising their different positions in relation to outworker regulation. 
To date, the successes of consumer activist campaigns have been concentrated in 
segment (a), where the appearance of social responsibility reinforces the brand 
message, and (c) where firms are operated by people who willingly comply with 
labour laws.  Both these sectors are likely to have complied with earlier forms of 
outwork regulation. Some firms in segment (b), on the other hand, have actively 
resisted anti-sweatshop campaigns and oppose the new regulations, are likely to 
continue to do so.  Firms in segment (d), on the other hand, might be expected to 
reorganise their activities to quietly slip out from under the net of regulation. In 
essence, their competitive advantage derives from their positioning on the periphery 
of regulation, where legislative ambiguities can be profitably exploited.  There are no 
grounds for assuming that the gains made with regulating firms in segments (a) and 
(c) will extend to firms in segments (b) and (d), unless there is commercial advantage 
from cooperating or commercial disadvantage from not cooperating.  These ‘amoral’ 
firms should be the primary targets of regulation.   
In this author’s reading, the Victorian Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act 
2003 incorporates three escape clauses that will enable such firms to deny 
responsibility for outworker entitlements. First, firms that are insolvent are exempt 
from the Act’s obligations. This enables unscrupulous firms to simply exit the 
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industry and re-enter at a later time under a new name – a strategy not uncommon 
in the clothing sector. Second, the obligations apply only when the organisational 
relationship takes a direct contracting configuration.  In this case, the intervention can 
be defeated by ‘breaking’ the supply chain and dealing only in (apparently) arms-
length purchases. Third, because core firms are exempt from the obligations if they 
‘seek a written statement from a subcontractor which states the money payable to 
outworkers for work done under the contract has been paid’, the most powerful firms 
may be able to simply pass responsibility down the chain. Power relationships in the 
supply chain will continue to frame the allocation of responsibilities.    
Experiences in other jurisdictions provide some indications of the creative 
avoidance strategies that might emerge. In response to the voluntary Ethical Trading 
Initiative, which commits US retailers subcontracting in low wage countries to 
upholding ILO labour standards, Hong Kong based intermediaries (analogous to 
Australian outwork middlemen) have extended their services to incorporate the 
management of compliance in Chinese source factories. In addition to the obvious 
potential for conflicts of interest, these new responsibilities encourage the creation of 
institutional barriers intended to insulate Western buyers from unwanted knowledge 
about manufacturing conditions.  Moreover, as intermediaries restructure cross-border 
governance to consolidate their control over work practices in supplier factories, they 
are vertically reintegrating subcontractors into multi-site organisations (Weller 2002). 
The result is an increase in the power of ‘middlemen’ relative to both retailers and 
manufacturers (Hale 2000).  This example highlights how firms adapt their operations 
and restructure their linkages to both accommodate new rules and use them to pursue 
competitive interests. Whilst the effect of re-regulation of the structure of the 
Australian industry will be difficult to predict and quantify, there is no doubt that it 
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will have effects. The Hong Kong example suggests the empowerment of middle-
level gatekeepers that control flows of information in the supply chain.   
A final point concerns the scale and scope of regulatory intervention.  Given the 
inhospitable character of Federal labour market policies, recent regulatory changes 
have been developed at State level and have concentrated on micro-level interventions 
in inter-firm and workplace relations.  In the case of a dispersed industry like garment 
outwork, micro-level labour management will always be faced with enforcement 
failures, and unenforceable laws generally invite infringement.  If, on the other hand, 
the prevalence of outwork in the Australian economy is understood as the outcome of 
an intersection of trade policies, the rules of the social security system and the 
international un-competitiveness of local garment firms, then the Federal jurisdiction, 
which controls these contextual forces, must remain the crucial site for intervention. 
Because of its industrial characteristics, garment production will not disappear from 
the Australian economy, but the industry’s size and its forms of organisation can be 
managed indirectly; for example, by ensuring that unemployed and under-employed 
workers are in a position to refuse unreasonable work, or by introducing industrial 
sewing machine technologies that prohibit their operation on domestic power 
supplies.  
A nation with a well-developed regulatory framework has at its disposal a 
broader range of regulatory options than the strategies of the anti-sweatshop 
repertoire, which assume transnational production in the context of weak national 
regulatory frameworks.   Although outwork was never effectively managed in the 
arbitral system, interventions need not and should not rely solely on consumer 
pressure, firm goodwill or media interest. To bring regulation to unwilling firms and 
hesitant workers it must be accompanied by active, independent surveillance,  must 
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not rely on worker complaints, and must be constantly refined as new avoidance 
strategies emerge.   
CONCLUSION 
Australia’s new forms of regulation of the clothing outwork sector rely on a hybrid 
‘value chain’ metaphor that oversimplifies the complex array of organisational forms 
that coexist within and between firms in the real world.   This paper has provided a 
detailed critique of the assumptions underlying the new interventions.  It has 
suggested that to be effective, policies should not simply apply strategies developed 
overseas, but should seek to analyse and respond to the unique circumstances of the 
Australian clothing industries.  Interventions based on the assumption that firms are 
‘moral’ agents are unlikely to alter the behaviour of unscrupulous firms.  
 Despite its exceptional aspects, the similarities between outwork and other less 
secure and less reliable forms of work in contemporary Australia are real and 
persistent. Seeing outwork as a unique, sectoral phenomenon generated solely by 
conditions within the clothing industries separates outwork from more general labour 
market and social welfare issues. This perpetuates the myth that unregulated outwork 
is the ‘rotten apple’ in the business basket, rather than an integral part of the more 
general neo-liberal policy agenda of undermining labour standards. The Federal 
Government’s support for the regulation of outwork in 1996 enabled further labour 
market ‘reform’ to be presented as a politically palatable possibility.  Finally, by 
constructing firms as moral agents and extending firm jurisdiction over labour, the 
new forms of outwork regulation can be viewed as effectively privatising the 
regulation of workers’ wages and conditions. Whether or not this is a positive 
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development needs to be debated vigorously; its implications extend beyond the 
short-term issues of one sector.  
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1  This paper was written before the introduction of the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 and does not consider how Work Choices will alter the situation of 
outworkers.  
2  This occurs through complex circuits of debt, in which the bankruptcy of one firm could set 
off a chain reaction of associated failures.  Industry insiders describe the sector as having 
contracted below its necessary competitive ‘critical mass.’    
3 As international logistics services improve, local ‘quick response’ production offers less 
‘natural’ protection.  In addition, while in other Western economies smaller garment brands 
compete by outsourcing production tasks to adjacent, economically dependent low wage 
nations, this option is less practical in Australia. I have argued elsewhere that Australian 
firms’ offshore assembly in Fiji cannot be viewed as equivalent to the road-based US–Mexico 
or EU-Eastern Europe connections (see Weller 2000a). 
4  Transaction cost theory anticipates that outwork organised around existing social networks 
will incur fewer coordination and organisational costs.  However, while intermediaries have 
in the past been recruited through ethnic community networks, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that more formal recruitment mechanisms are developing as outwork becomes 
institutionalised. 
5 Data on profit rates in this industry is distorted by the high firm exit rate (which increases 
the apparent profits of remaining firms), but I think on balance this conclusion is valid.   
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6 An exception is a firm like Australian work-wear specialist Yakka, where the core values 
celebrate Australian workers and egalitarian mateship. 
7 According to De Winter’s (2000) relational analysis, moral agency is itself a social construct 
with no content prior to or outside of social historical processes. 
8  Perhaps this is because the characterisation ‘heroic’ is reserved for men (Enstad 1999). 
 
